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ABSTRACT: The “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” 
includes what is called an “individual responsibility requirement” 
or mandate that all persons buy health insurance from a private 
company and a separate “penalty” enforcing this requirement. In 
this paper, I do not critique the individual mandate on originalist 
grounds. Instead, I explain why the individual mandate is unconsti-
tutional under the existing doctrine by which the Supreme Court 
construes the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses and the 
tax power. There are three principal claims.  
First (Part II), since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has devel-
oped a doctrine allowing the regulation of wholly intrastate activity: 
the substantial effects doctrine. Although commonly conceived as a 
Commerce Clause doctrine, from its inception this doctrine has 
been grounded in the Necessary and Proper Clause. In the 1990s, 
the Supreme Court developed a judicially administrable test for 
whether it is “necessary” for Congress to reach intrastate activity 
that substantially affects interstate commerce: the distinction be-
tween economic and noneconomic intrastate activity. Because the 
individual mandate fails to satisfy the requirements of this test as 
understood under existing doctrine, it exceeds the power granted to 
Congress by the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses as 
currently construed by the Supreme Court. The mandate also fails 
to satisfy an alternative to the substantial effects doctrine that was 
proposed by Justice Scalia in a concurring opinion in Gonzales v. 
Raich because it extends beyond the regulation of intrastate activity 
to reach inactivity.  
Second (Part III), because the “individual responsibility re-
quirement” purports to be a regulation of commerce and cannot 
possibly be construed as a tax, it is not justified under the tax power 
of Congress; and, if the “requirement” or mandate is an unconstitu-
tional regulation, there is nothing for the “penalty” to enforce. Nei-
ther is the penalty, considered apart from the regulatory require-
ment, a tax under current doctrine.  
Third (Part IV), the Supreme Court should not further expand 
Congress’s power beyond existing doctrine to allow it to mandate 
that individuals engage in economic activity by entering into con-
tracts with private companies. Such economic mandates are directly 
analogous to the commandeering of the states that the Supreme 
Court has held to be an improper exercise of the commerce power. 
The very few mandates that are imposed on the people pertain to 
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their fundamental duties as citizens of the United States, such as the 
duty to defend the country or to pay for its operation. A newfound 
congressional power to impose economic mandates to facilitate the 
regulation of interstate commerce would fundamentally alter the 
relationship of citizen and state by unconstitutionally commandeer-
ing the people. 
In Part V, I conclude with a “realist” assessment of the likeli-
hood that the Supreme Court will actually find the mandate to be 
unconstitutional. 
I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION SAYS 
The “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” includes what 
is called an “individual responsibility requirement” that all persons 
buy health insurance from a private company.1 Is this requirement 
constitutional? There are three ways to analyze whether a law is 
constitutional or not. Does it conflict with what the Constitution 
says? Does it conflict with what the Supreme Court has said? Are 
there five votes for a particular result? Unless we are clear about 
which sense of “unconstitutional” we are using, we are likely to talk 
past each other.  
In my book Restoring the Lost Constitution,2 I defend interpreting 
the text of the Constitution according to its original public meaning. 
I also contend that the evidence is overwhelming that the core 
original public meaning of “commerce” was trade or exchange of 
goods, including their transportation. Commerce means “with mer-
chandise” and shares the same root as “merchants.” Even broad-
ened to include all “intercourse” between states, commerce is still 
confined to the communication of something—whether goods, 
people, or messages—from one state to another. Commerce consti-
tutes a subset of economic activity that is distinct from the economic 
activities of manufacturing or agriculture, both of which involve the 
production of the things to be transported or communicated from 
                                                          
 
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010). 
2 RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY (2005). 
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one state to another. 
Not only was this the original meaning of “commerce,” but the 
Supreme Court has never expressly updated or broadened its 
meaning of the Commerce Clause, which says that Congress has the 
power “to regulate Commerce . . . among the Several states.”3 In-
stead, during the New Deal, the Supreme Court used the Necessary 
and Proper Clause to allow Congress to regulate economic activities 
that were neither interstate nor commerce because such activities 
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
Under the original meaning of “commerce,” insurance contracts 
did not qualify. Such contracts are mere promises to pay money 
upon the occurrence of specified conditions, and do not involve the 
conveyance of goods or other items from one state to another. And 
so the Supreme Court held in the 1869 case of Paul v. Virginia that 
“issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce.”4 
As the Court in Paul elaborated: 
                                                          
 
The policies are simple contracts of indemnity against loss 
by fire, entered into between the corporations and the as-
sured, for a consideration paid by the latter. These contracts 
are not articles of commerce in any proper meaning of the 
word. They are not subjects of trade and barter offered in 
the market as something having an existence and value in-
dependent of the parties to them. They are not commodities 
to be shipped or forwarded from one State to another, and 
then put up for sale. They are like other personal contracts 
between parties which are completed by their signature and 
the transfer of the consideration.5 
 
What is more, the Court further held that the fact that an insurance 
company and the insured were in different states did not render an 
insurance contract interstate commerce. 
 
 
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3. 
4 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868). 
5 Id. 
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Such contracts are not interstate transactions, though the 
parties may be domiciled in different States. The policies do 
not take effect—are not executed contracts—until delivered 
by the agent in Virginia. They are, then, local transactions, 
and are governed by the local law. They do not constitute a 
part of the commerce between the States any more than a 
contract for the purchase and sale of goods in Virginia by a 
citizen of New York whilst in Virginia would constitute a 
portion of such commerce.6 
 
It is worth noting that Paul was decided in 1869, well before 
what came to be derisively called the Lochner Era. Thus, under the 
original meaning of the Commerce Clause, as affirmed by the 
Court, Congress lacks any power over the health insurance busi-
ness. The insurance business, like the businesses of manufacturing 
or agriculture, is to be regulated exclusively by the states. 
And so matters stood for 75 years—or more accurately for 150 
years since the Founding—until the New Deal Supreme Court re-
visited the issue in 1944. In United States v. South-Eastern Underwrit-
ers,7 the Court for the first time allowed Congress to regulate the 
interstate insurance business. In his opinion, Justice Black pur-
ported to adhere to original meaning: “Ordinarily courts do not 
construe words used in the Constitution so as to give them a mean-
ing more narrow than one which they had in the common parlance 
of the times in which the Constitution was written.”8 He then con-
cluded that, “[t]o hold that the word ‘commerce’ as used in the 
Commerce Clause does not include a business such as insurance 
would do just that.”9 Based only on a solitary passing observation 
by Alexander Hamilton concerning insurance, and the fact that “the 
                                                          
 
6 Id.
7 United States v. Se. Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
8 Id. at 539.
9 Id.
 New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 5:581 586 
dictionaries, encyclopedias, and other books of the period show that 
it included trade,”10 Justice Black contended that 
a heavy burden is on him who asserts that the plenary 
power which the Commerce Clause grants to Congress to 
regulate ‘Commerce among the several States’ does not in-
clude the power to regulate trading in insurance to the 
same extent that it includes power to regulate other trades 
or businesses conducted across state lines.11  
 
But what of Paul and the seventy-five years’ worth of cases that 
relied on it as precedent? Justice Black made short work of the now-
hallowed doctrine of stare decisis. All of these cases, he contended, 
involved upholding state insurance regulations that had been es-
sential in the absence of congressional regulation. The existence of 
these state regulatory schemes did not deprive Congress of its 
power to enter the field. And so was born the authority for Con-
gress to regulate health insurance companies that had, until then, 
been exclusively regulated by the states.12  
It is not my purpose here to demonstrate that the New Deal 
Court was wrong and even disingenuous when it claimed that the 
power to regulate the insurance business was justified by original 
meaning, though I do not mind recalling the Court’s willingness to 
ignore a seventy-five-year-old well-entrenched precedent to uphold 
the post-New Deal powers of Congress. Nor will I be contesting the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate on the ground that it 
violates the original meaning of what the Constitution says.  
Instead, my claim is that the mandate is unconstitutional in the 
second sense: based on what the Supreme Court has said in its Com-
merce and Necessary and Proper Clause decisions, presented in 
Part II—and also in its tax power decisions, presented in Part III. 
                                                          
 
10 Id. 
11 Id. (footnote omitted). 
12 Immediately after South-Eastern Underwriters, Congress passed the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (1945) in order to preserve the existing state 
regulatory schemes.
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Existing doctrine reveals the individual mandate is unconstitutional 
even if we assume that Congress has the power to regulate the in-
surance business that the New Deal Supreme Court gave it in South-
Eastern Underwriters.  
My position rests entirely on post-New Deal constitutional 
cases and doctrine, except where that doctrine does not reach a de-
finitive conclusion so new reasoning is required. In Part IV, I con-
tend that the Supreme Court should not extend the powers of Con-
gress beyond what is authorized by existing law to uphold a man-
date on individuals to engage in economic activity. Finally, in Part 
V, I conclude by briefly addressing the likelihood that the Supreme 
Court would actually hold the mandate unconstitutional. 
II. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE AND EXISTING COMMERCE AND 
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE DOCTRINE 
A. Existing Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clause Doctrine 
1. THE LAW PROFESSORS’ UNDERSTANDING.  
Let me begin by telling the story of the Supreme Court’s Com-
merce Clause doctrine the way that most law professors today both 
teach and understand it. Until 1995, law professors believed that, 
beginning in 1937 with cases such as NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel,13  United States v. Darby,14  and Wickard v. Filburn, 15  the Su-
preme Court had so expanded the scope of the commerce power of 
Congress that Congress could do anything it wanted provided it 
was not violating some other constitutional constraint, like the First 
Amendment. 
Law professors were shocked, then, when the Supreme Court in 
1995 held in United States v. Lopez16 that the Gun Free School Zone 
Act unconstitutionally exceeded the commerce power of Congress. 
They interpreted this case as an aberration. By 1995, Congress had 
                                                          
 
13 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). 
14 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941). 
15 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
16 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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become so complacent about the scope of its powers that it did not 
even bother to make findings about why the act was within its 
commerce power. Most law professors were confident that, in the 
future, the Court would uphold any law if Congress made adequate 
findings that the activity it sought to regulate had a substantial ef-
fect on interstate commerce.  
So law professors were, once again, surprised when the Su-
preme Court in 2000 held in United States v. Morrison17 that the Vio-
lence Against Women Act was unconstitutional—notwithstanding 
extensive hearings and findings about the substantial effects of vio-
lence against women on interstate commerce. In the wake of Morri-
son, law professors started to believe that the Court just might be 
serious about drawing a line between what is national and what is 
local, and lower courts started to be more receptive to Commerce 
Clause challenges.  
In one such case I helped bring on behalf of Angel Raich and 
Diane Monson, the Ninth Circuit held that the Controlled Sub-
stances Act was unconstitutional as applied to marijuana grown at 
home for medical use as authorized by state law.18 When the Su-
preme Court in Gonzales v. Raich19 turned away this challenge, how-
ever, law professors breathed a sigh of relief that they had been 
right all along. They reverted to their pre-Lopez understanding that 
Congress can do pretty much whatever it wants under its com-
merce power.  
Indeed, the new conventional wisdom is that, so long as Con-
gress establishes a sweeping and ambitious regulatory scheme, it 
can reach any activity—whether economic or not—that it deems to 
be essential to that scheme. In other words, the more grandiose the 
claim of power by Congress, the stronger is its claim of constitu-
tionality.  
Hence some law professors have confidently asserted that Con-
gress may, for the first time in American history, use its commerce 
                                                          
 
17 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
18 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003). 
19 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
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power to mandate that all individuals in the United States engage in 
economic activity.20 After all, this mandate is essential to Congress’s 
grandiose new scheme regulating private insurance companies, so 
under Raich, it must be constitutional. 
Of course, when evaluating the individual mandate, five Jus-
tices are always free to disregard what the Court has previously 
said, just as Justice Black and a majority of Justices did in South-
Eastern Underwriters. But this raises the third sense of constitutional-
ity: what we can predict five Justices will do. Before we get to that 
issue, we need first to examine what the Supreme Court has said 
and what it has not said about the Commerce Clause. It is to this 
question I now turn. 
2. THE NEW DEAL AND WARREN COURT’S CASES.  
Before 1937, the Supreme Court had held that Congress could 
not use its power over interstate commerce as a pretext to reach 
such economic but noncommercial intrastate activities as manufac-
turing or agriculture, activities which were instead within the police 
power of states to regulate.21 In 1937, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel, 22  the Supreme Court held for the first time that Congress 
could regulate the labor relations of manufacturers and their work-
ers because labor strife affected interstate commerce by obstructing 
the flow of manufactured goods bound for the interstate market. As 
the Court stated, “acts which directly burden or obstruct interstate 
or foreign commerce, or its free flow, are within the reach of the 
congressional power.”23 Such acts “are not rendered immune be-
cause they grow out of labor disputes. It is the effect upon com-
merce, not the source of the injury, which is the criterion.”24  
                                                          
 
20 See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health Insur-
ance (The O'Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Wake Forest Univ. 
Legal Studies Paper No. 1334955), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1334955. 
21 United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
22 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
23 Id. at 31. 
24 Id. at 31–32. 
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In other words, although the activity being regulated was not 
commerce, it could be reached because of its effects on commerce. 
“Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately 
considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to in-
terstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to 
protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress 
cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.”25 Neverthe-
less, the Court concluded its opinion by offering the following reaf-
firmation of the scheme of limited and enumerated powers: “Un-
doubtedly the scope of this power must be considered in the light of 
our dual system of government,” wrote Chief Justice Hughes, “and 
may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate com-
merce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our 
complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction be-
tween what is national and what is local and create a completely 
centralized government.”26 
Then in 1941, in United States v. Darby27 the Court further ex-
panded the power of Congress. Exactly how it did so will prove 
important in assessing the constitutionality of the individual man-
date. In Darby, the Court separately considered two distinct powers 
asserted by Congress in the Fair Labor Standards Act. First was the 
“power to prohibit the shipment in interstate commerce of lumber 
manufactured by employees whose wages are less than a prescribed 
minimum or whose weekly hours of labor at that wage are greater 
than a prescribed maximum.”28 In assessing this claim of power, 
as in Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court in Darby did not reject the 
original meaning of “commerce.” Instead, it said that, “[w]hile 
manufacture is not of itself interstate commerce the shipment of manu-
factured goods interstate is such commerce and the prohibition of 
such shipment by Congress is indubitably a regulation of the com-
                                                          
 
25 Id. at 37. 
26 Id. (emphasis added). 
27 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
28 Id. at 108.  
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merce.”29 As authority for this proposition the Court relied heavily 
on Chief Justice Marshall’s evaluation of the Commerce Clause in 
Gibbons v. Ogden.30 In sum, the prohibition on shipping specified 
goods in interstate commerce was a direct exercise of Congress’s 
power over interstate commerce. 
Yet, although Darby did not expand the meaning of “com-
merce” to uphold this part of the statute, it did importantly expand 
the power of Congress by refusing to examine whether the Con-
gressional assertion of its commerce power was a pretext for reach-
ing activity that fell within the police power of states: “The motive 
and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for 
the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitu-
tion places no restriction and over which the courts are given no 
control,”31 wrote Justice Stone. “Whatever their motive and pur-
pose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitu-
tional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Con-
gress by the Commerce Clause.”32  
The Court then turned its attention to a different claim of 
power, the power “to prohibit the employment of workmen in the 
production of goods ‘for interstate commerce’ at other than pre-
scribed wages and hours.”33 In assessing “whether such restriction 
on the production of goods for commerce is a permissible exercise 
of the commerce power,” the Court held that the “power of Con-
gress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of 
commerce among the states.”34 The power also “extends to those ac-
tivities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of 
the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropri-
ate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the 
granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.”35 
                                                          
 
29 Id. at 113 (emphases added).  
30 See id. at 113–14.  
31 Id. at 115. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 105.  
34 Id. at 118 (emphasis added).  
35 Id.  
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As authority for this principle, the Court relied not on the 
Commerce Clause case of Gibbons but instead upon the Necessary 
and Proper Clause Case of McCulloch v. Maryland.36 This tells us 
that the “substantial effects” doctrine established by the New Deal 
Court concerns the application of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
in the context of the commerce power. In other words it is a doc-
trine applying, explaining, and implicitly limiting the use of “neces-
sary and proper” means to execute Congress’s power over inter-
state commerce.  
This was big. To uphold the first of these claims of power, the 
Court abandoned one of the principal limits on the Necessary and 
Proper Clause that Chief Justice John Marshall had asserted in 
McCulloch:  
 
Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt 
measures which are prohibited by the constitution; or 
should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass 
laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the gov-
ernment; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, 
should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to 
say that such an act was not the law of the land.37 
 
So important was this qualification to Marshall that he invoked 
this passage in defense of his decision in McCulloch when writing 
anonymously as “A Friend of the Constitution.”38 So, by discarding 
this aspect of McCulloch, the Supreme Court in Darby again broke 
sharply from over one-hundred years of its own doctrine.  
Darby is also big because, to uphold the second claim of power, 
the Court allowed Congress to regulate wholly intrastate activities 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause that it could not justify as a 
regulation of interstate commerce itself. The doctrine allowing Con-
                                                          
 
36 See id.  
37 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (emphasis added). 
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gress to regulate intrastate activity that substantially affects inter-
state commerce, therefore, defines the scope of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. Therefore, all future cases applying this doctrine are 
not, strictly speaking, “Commerce Clause cases.” Instead, they are 
“Necessary and Proper Clause cases” in the context of the regula-
tion of interstate commerce.39 
Then came Wickard v. Filburn,40 in which the Court upheld the 
provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which limited the 
quantity of wheat that an individual farmer could grow, not to sell 
on the interstate market, but to consume on the farm by feeding his 
livestock and his family. As historian Barry Cushman has chroni-
cled,41 the implications of upholding this claim of power were so 
disturbing to the New Deal Justices that they held the matter over 
for reargument. Yet, Justice Jackson’s opinion made the case seem 
like a natural application of the Necessary and Proper Clause. “The 
question would merit little consideration since our decision in 
United States v. Darby, sustaining the federal power to regulate pro-
duction of goods for commerce,” he wrote, “except for the fact that 
this Act extends federal regulation to production not intended in 
any part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm.”42  
Once again, the Court did not expand the meaning of “com-
merce” beyond its original meaning when upholding the power of 
Congress to reach intrastate activity that is not itself commerce: 
“[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be re-
garded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by 
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate 
                                                                                                                         
 
38 John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, July 5, 1819, 
reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 187 (Gerald 
Gunther ed., Stanford University Press 1969). 
39 See J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2002 
U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 619 (2002) (“[T]he ‘affecting commerce’ cases derive from the 
Necessary and Proper Clause . . . .”); and id. at 618–19 (discussing Darby). 
40 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
41  BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 212–19 (1998). 
42 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 118. 
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commerce. . . .”43 It then adopted the principle that the fact that Ros-
coe Filburn’s “own contribution to the demand for wheat may be 
trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of fed-
eral regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with 
that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.”44  
In Wickard, the government contended that “the statute . . . is 
sustainable as a ‘necessary and proper’ implementation of the 
power of Congress over interstate commerce.”45 Once again, the 
Court in Wickard relied not only on Gibbons, but on McCulloch as 
well.46 In short, like Darby, Wickard is both a Commerce Clause and 
a Necessary and Proper Clause case. So too were the civil rights 
cases of Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States47 and Katzenbach v. 
McClung.48  
In Heart of Atlanta, the Court found that because Congress had 
the power to regulate and protect the interstate flow of persons, 
racial discrimination in the provision of public accommodations 
burdened that flow and Congress therefore had the power to reach 
this otherwise intrastate activity. “[T]he power of Congress to pro-
mote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the 
local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States of 
origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful 
effect upon that commerce.”49 In response to the objection that “the 
operation of the motel here is of a purely local character,” the Court 
quoted the passage from Darby that relied on McCulloch, including 
the citation to the case.50 Likewise, in McClung, when the Court 
turned its consideration to “The Power of Congress to Regulate 
Local Activities,”51 it rested the power of Congress to reach intra-
state activities on the power of Congress “‘[t]o regulate Commerce . 
                                                          
 
43 Id. at 125 (emphasis added). 
44 Id. at 127–28. 
45 Id. at 119 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18). 
46 Id. at 129, n.29. 
47 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
48 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
49 Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258. 
50 See id. (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941)). 
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. . among the several States’ and . . . the power ‘[t]o make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers. . . .’”52  
3. THE REHNQUIST COURT CASES. 
 With these canonical cases in mind, let us now fast forward to 
consider how the Supreme Court interpreted its own substantial 
effects doctrine in Lopez, Morrison and Raich. In Lopez, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist famously affirmed that “[w]e start with first principles. 
The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated 
powers. . . . As James Madison wrote, ‘the powers delegated by the 
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and de-
fined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are nu-
merous and indefinite.’”53  
The Chief Justice then identified “three broad categories of ac-
tivity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power.”54 
First, “Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce.” 55  Second, “Congress is empowered to regulate and 
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or 
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come 
only from intrastate activities.”56 Finally, “Congress’ commerce au-
thority includes the power to regulate those activities having a sub-
stantial relation to interstate commerce . . . those activities that sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce.”57 
Turning to the third of these categories, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
offered the following summary of the “substantial effects” cases 
decided since the New Deal: “[W]e have upheld a wide variety of 
congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where we 
have concluded that the activity substantially affected interstate 
                                                                                                                         
 
51 Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 301–02.  
52 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 18).  
53 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J.). 
54 Id. at 558. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 558–59. 
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commerce.”58 He then provided the following examples: “the regu-
lation of intrastate coal mining, intrastate extortionate credit trans-
actions, restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies, inns 
and hotels catering to interstate guests, and production and con-
sumption of home-grown wheat.”59 From these, he concluded that 
“the pattern is clear. Where economic activity substantially affects 
interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sus-
tained.”60 Because the Gun Free School Zone Act regulated a “class 
of activity” that lay outside the scope of this doctrine—the none-
conomic activity of possessing a gun within 1000 feet of a school—it 
was held to be unconstitutional.  
The above analysis of N.L.R.B., Darby, Wickard, Heart of Atlanta, 
and McClung reveals that the judicial doctrine by which Congress 
may reach intrastate economic activity that substantially affects in-
terstate commerce rested on the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Then, in Lopez, the Court restricted this combined power to the 
regulation of economic activity. “Even Wickard,” wrote Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, “which is perhaps the most far reaching example of 
Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved eco-
nomic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school zone 
does not.” 61  In this way the distinction between economic and 
noneconomic intrastate activity provided a limiting doctrine on the 
reach of the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer objected to the major-
ity’s distinction between “economic” and “noneconomic” intrastate 
activity. “Although the majority today attempts to categorize Perez, 
McClung, and Wickard as involving intrastate ‘economic activity,’ 
the Courts that decided each of those cases did not focus upon the 
economic nature of the activity regulated. Rather, they focused 
upon whether that activity affected interstate or foreign com-
                                                          
 
58 Id. at 559. 
59 Id. at 559–60 (citations omitted). 
60 Id. at 560 (emphasis added). 
61 Id. 
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merce.”62 To this Chief Justice Rehnquist responded that, by the 
reasoning of the government and Justice Breyer, “we are hard 
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is with-
out power to regulate.”63  
In order to preserve the constitutional scheme of limited and 
enumerated powers, some line was needed to separate wholly in-
trastate activities that Congress could reach from intrastate activi-
ties that were solely within the police power of states. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist identified this line by looking back over all the previous 
substantial effects cases to see what they had in common: the regu-
lation of intrastate economic activity. And he drew this line not-
withstanding Justice Breyer’s objection that the distinction between 
economic and noneconomic activity had not been highlighted or 
even discussed in these previous cases. 
But why draw the line at noneconomic intrastate activity? To 
answer this question, we need to revisit the argument over the con-
stitutionality of the national bank that was upheld in McCulloch v. 
Maryland.64 In response to the argument that such a bank was not 
truly necessary under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall famously equated (or seemed to equate) the 
meaning of “necessary” with “convenient.” “If reference be had to 
its use, in the common affairs of the world, or in approved authors,” 
the word “necessary,” “frequently imports no more than that one 
thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another. To employ the 
means necessary to an end, is generally understood as employing 
any means calculated to produce the end. . . .”65  
This passage became famous because the matter of convenience 
would seem to concern policy choices that lie beyond the purview 
of the courts. As President Madison, who supported the result in 
McCulloch, privately objected: “Does not the court also relinquish, 
by their doctrine, all control on the legislative exercise of unconsti-
                                                          
 
62 Id. at 628 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
63 Id. at 564 (majority opinion). 
64 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (4 Wheat.) (1819). 
65 Id. at 413–14. 
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tutional powers?”66 When the matter of a measure’s necessity “as-
sumes the character of mere expediency or policy,” it becomes 
“evidently beyond the reach of Judicial cognizance. . . . [B]y what 
handle could the Court take hold of the case?”67  
In response to stinging public criticisms of the decision, Mar-
shall defended his opinion in a series of newspaper essays writing 
pseudonymously as “A Friend to the Union,” and later as “A Friend 
of the Constitution.”68 In these essays, Marshall invoked a less well-
known passage of McCulloch that omitted the word “convenient,” 
and defined “necessary” as “‘needful,’ ‘requisite,’ ‘essential,’ ‘con-
ducive to,’ . . .”69  While granting Congress’s discretion as to means, 
Marshall denied that the Court ever said “that the word ‘necessary’ 
means whatever may be ‘convenient,’ or ‘useful.’ And when it uses 
‘conducive to,’ that word is associated with others plainly showing 
that no remote, no distant conduciveness to the object, is in the mind of 
the court.”70 In a later letter, Marshall said that the constitutionality 
of a particular means “depends on their being the natural, direct, 
and appropriate means, or the known and usual means, for the execu-
tion of the given power.”71 
In defending his opinion in McCulloch, Marshall claimed the author-
ity of the “masterly argument” made years before by then-Secretary of 
the Treasury Alexander Hamilton in his opinion provided to President 
Washington on behalf of the constitutionality of the first national bank. 
Marshall quoted this passage from Hamilton’s opinion: “That every 
power vested in a government, is, in its nature, sovereign, and in-
                                                          
 
66 Letter from James Madison to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 3 LETTERS 
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 143, 144 (Phila., J.P. Lippincott & Co. 1867). 
67 Id.  
68 See John Marshall, Letters to the Editor, “A Friend to the Union”, PHILA. UNION, 
Apr. 24–28, 1819, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. 
MARYLAND, supra note 38, at 78; and John Marshall, “A Friend of the Constitution” 
essays, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, June 30–July 15, 1819, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S 
DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra note 38, at 155. 
69 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 418. 
70 John Marshall, Letter to the Editor, “A Friend to the Union”, PHILA. UNION, Apr. 
28, 1819, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra 
note 38, at 100 (emphasis added). 
71 Id. (emphasis added). 
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cludes, by force of the term a right to employ all the means requisite 
and fairly applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power.”72  
In many respects Marshall’s opinion on McCulloch could be 
characterized as plagiarizing his mentor Hamilton’s opinion on the 
first bank.73 Here is how Hamilton defines “necessary”: According 
to “the grammatical” and “popular sense of the term . . . necessary 
often means no more than needful, requisite, incidental, useful or con-
ducive to.” 74 But while Hamilton, like Marshall, strongly rejected an 
overly strict reading of necessary “as if the word absolutely, or in-
dispensably, had been prefixed to it,” 75  he also rejected a com-
pletely open-ended reading of “necessary and proper.” “It may 
truly be said of every Government, as well as that of the United 
States, that it only has a right to pass such laws as are necessary and 
proper to accomplish the objects intrusted to it: for no government 
has a right to do merely what it pleases.”76 
                                                          
Hamilton then considered what should be the legal “test” for 
whether a measure was necessary under the clause. First, he re-
jected the idea that such a test should attempt to weigh the degree 
of necessity. “The degree in which a measure is necessary, can 
never be a test of the legal right to adopt it. That must be a matter of 
opinion; and can only be a test of expediency.”77 Instead, Hamilton 
then offered this test: “The relation between the measure and the end, 
between the nature of the mean employed toward the execution of a 
power and the object of that power, must be the criterion of constitu-
tionality; not the more or less of necessity or utility.”78  
 
72 John Marshall, “A Friend of the Constitution”, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, July 2, 
1819, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra 
note 38, at 176. 
73 See Beck, supra note 39, at 600-03 (comparing the two opinions). 
74 Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank (Feb. 23, 
1791), in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED 
STATES 95, 97 (M. St. Clair Clarke & D. A. Hall eds., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 
1967) (1832). 
75 Id. at 98. 
76 Id. (emphasis in original). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
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In modern parlance, according to Hamilton, there must be an 
appropriate fit between means and ends, which is exactly what the 
Supreme Court’s doctrine distinguishing between economic and 
noneconomic activity seeks to discern. Rather than allowing Con-
gress to do ‘merely what it pleases,’ the economic-noneconomic dis-
tinction provides a judicially administrable line by which to identify 
intrastate activities that are likely to be closely enough related to 
interstate commerce as to make it appropriate for Congress to reach. 
The distinction is useful because the regulation of intrastate eco-
nomic activity is far more likely to be closely related to interstate 
commerce than is the vast array of intrastate noneconomic activity. 
As Randy Beck has explained, “Given the close relationship be-
tween intrastate and interstate economic activity, a statute regulat-
ing local economic conduct will usually be calculated to accomplish 
an end legitimately encompassed within the plenary congressional 
authority over interstate commerce.”79  
To paraphrase Hamilton, by adopting the distinction between 
economic and noneconomic activity, the Court provided a workable 
doctrine by which the necessity of a particular regulation of intra-
state activity could be assessed without need for a court to evaluate 
‘the more or less necessity or utility’ of the measure.80  By limiting 
the substantial effects doctrine to economic intrastate activity, the 
Supreme Court provided the modern legal ‘test’ or ‘criterion of con-
stitutionality’ for whether a regulation of intrastate activity is what 
‘may truly be said’ to be necessary under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. By this doctrine Congress is held within its enumerated 
powers and denied the ‘right to do merely what it pleases.’ 
                                                          
 
79 Beck, supra note 39, at 625. Beck considers this test to be effectuating the re-
quirement that a law be “proper,” rather than the requirement that it be “necessary.” 
See id. at 648. Assessing whether this claim is correct on originalist grounds would 
require the examination of a mass of evidence and is beyond the scope of this article. 
What matters for present purposes is that Beck does not dispute, but instead insists, 
that the economic-noneconomic distinction in existing “Commerce Clause” doctrine 
is actually effectuating and limiting the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
80 See id. at 626 (characterizing the Lopez decision as an effort to address the degree 
question “on a more categorical basis, rather than through open-ended, case-by-case 
consideration.”). 
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Five years later, in United States v. Morrison, the Court reaf-
firmed the economic-noneconomic distinction within its substantial 
affects doctrine: “While we need not adopt a categorical rule against 
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to de-
cide these cases, thus far in our Nation’s history our cases have up-
held Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where 
that activity is economic in nature.”81 And it rejected “petitioners’ 
reasoning [that] would allow Congress to regulate any crime as 
long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has sub-
stantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consump-
tion.”82  
Once again, Justice Breyer questioned the economic-
noneconomic distinction. “[W]hy should we give critical constitu-
tional importance to the economic, or noneconomic, nature of an 
interstate-commerce-affecting cause? If chemical emanations 
through indirect environmental change cause identical, severe 
commercial harm outside a State, why should it matter whether 
local factories or home fireplaces release them?” 83  Then Justice 
Breyer expressly invoked the language of both the Commerce and 
Necessary and Proper Clauses, which “says nothing about either 
the local nature, or the economic nature, of an interstate-commerce-
affecting cause.”84  
Justice Breyer was correct to invoke the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. By rejecting his theory, however, the majority in Morrison in 
effect refused to interpret the Necessary and Proper Clause more 
expansively than the Court in Lopez read the New Deal cases to 
have done. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed the principle 
articulated in N.L.R.B. that “the Constitution requires a distinction 
between what is truly national and what is truly local. In recogniz-
                                                          
 
81 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). 
82 Id. at 615. 
83 Id. at 657 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
84 Id. 
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ing this fact we preserve one of the few principles that has been 
consistent since the Clause was adopted.”85  
So now we come to the 2005 case of Gonzales v. Raich. Did Raich 
cast aside the lens adopted by the Court in Lopez and Morrison 
through which it interpreted the post-New Deal cases that rested on 
both the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses? To the con-
trary. When reading the majority opinion in Raich, we must keep in 
mind that it had to be written in such a fashion as to attract Justice 
Kennedy’s fifth vote, which it did. (Justice Scalia did not join the 
Court’s opinion.) 
To begin, and most importantly, the majority in Raich does not 
reject the economic-noneconomic distinction, or the reading of 
Wickard that was adopted by the Court in Lopez. Instead, the Court 
holds that the production of marijuana is an economic activity. Here 
is what Justice Stevens says: “Our case law firmly establishes Con-
gress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an 
economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce.” 86  He then quotes the following passage from 
Wickard: “‘even if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not 
be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be 
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on 
interstate commerce.’”87 
Justice Stevens explained that Wickard “establishes that Con-
gress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself ‘com-
mercial,’ in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that fail-
ure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation 
of the interstate market in that commodity.”88  He then rejected An-
gel Raich’s claim that the production of her marijuana was not 
“economic,” by relying on the definition of “economic” found in a 
1966 Webster’s Dictionary. “Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Mor-
                                                          
 
85 Id. at 617–18 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (internal citations omitted). 
86 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (Stevens, J.) (internal citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
87 Id. (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942)). 
88 Gonzales 545 U.S. at 18. 
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rison, the activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially eco-
nomic. ‘Economics’ refers to ‘the production, distribution, and con-
sumption of commodities.’”89 So nothing in Justice Stevens’ opinion 
in Raich remotely challenges the framework of Lopez or Morrison—
not even its dictionary definition of “economic.”  
Moreover, invoking Webster’s Dictionary allowed the majority 
to avoid adopting the government’s theory that any activity that 
substituted for a market activity was economic.90 The government’s 
theory resembled Wickard insofar as Roscoe Filburn’s farming op-
eration could be regulated because his consumption of wheat on his 
farm substituted for his buying wheat in interstate commerce. But 
Wickard did not even hint at the proposition that Filburn’s intrastate 
activity was “economic” activity because it substituted for interstate 
commerce. No one would have doubted that Roscoe Filburn’s farm-
ing operation was economic activity regardless of whether its pro-
duce substituted for interstate commerce. The question in Wickard 
was, given that Filburn’s farming operation was not commerce, 
could it nevertheless be reached because it was necessary to the 
regulation of interstate commerce? Because Filburn’s and countless 
other farmers’ use of their own wheat, “though it may not be re-
garded as commerce,”91  substituted for buying interstate wheat, 
this wholly intrastate economic activity obstructed Congress’s 
scheme to increase the price of interstate wheat.92  
                                                          
In our briefs and at oral argument in Raich,93 we fought hard 
against the government’s market substitution theory on the 
grounds that, by this logic, virtually any activity could be deemed 
economic. Therefore, if the substitution theory is accepted, the 
economic-noneconomic distinction would be obliterated. Our ar-
 
89 Id. at 25. 
90 Reply Brief for Petitioners, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-1454). 
91 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 (1942). 
92 Id. at 128–29 (“Congress may properly have considered that wheat consumed on 
the farm where grown if wholly outside the scheme of regulation would have a sub-
stantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at 
increased prices.”). 
93 See Br. for Resp’t at 25, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-1454). 
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guments on this point were vindicated by the Court’s refusal to ac-
cept the government’s market substitution theory, adopting Web-
ster’s definition of “economic” instead.  
B. Applying Existing Doctrine to the Individual Insurance Mandate 
How does the individual mandate fare under existing Com-
merce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine? First we 
have to ascertain under which theory Congress purported to act. 
Does the mandate purport to regulate or protect the instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce? Does it purport to regulate or protect 
persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat 
may come only from intrastate activities? Or does it purport to 
regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate 
commerce, those activities that substantially affect interstate com-
merce? 
In the Act, Congress asserted that “[t]he individual responsibil-
ity requirement provided for in this section . . . is commercial and 
economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce, 
as a result of the effects described in paragraph (2).”94 In this find-
ing, Congress confusingly refers to its own requirement as “com-
mercial and economic in nature” and substantially affecting inter-
state commerce, rather than to the underlying activity being regu-
lated. There is, of course, no such Commerce or Necessary and 
Proper Clause doctrine. Nonetheless, Congress is clearly trying to 
invoke the third category identified in Lopez and Morrison—and 
preserved in Raich: the substantial effects doctrine.  
As we have seen, the substantial effects doctrine is not a pure 
application of the Commerce Clause, but is actually an assertion of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause to reach activity that is neither 
interstate nor commerce. Under the existing law assessing whether 
a law reaching intrastate activity is “necessary” to the regulation of 
interstate commerce, we must ask, (a) what is the “class of activity” 
                                                          
 
94 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(a)(1), 124 
Stat. 119 (2010). 
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reached by the statute, and (b) is it economic or noneconomic? In 
answering this question, the first thing to notice about all of the 
substantial effects cases—including N.L.R.B., Darby, Wickard, Heart 
of Atlanta, McClung, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich—is that each con-
cerns the regulation of a class of activities in which persons have 
freely chosen to engage: manufacturing steel or lumber, operating a 
hotel or restaurant, possessing a gun, perpetrating gender-
motivated violence, or growing marijuana.  
In sum, all these cases involve activity, not inactivity. In none of 
these cases did the government mandate that citizens engage in 
economic activity by entering into a contract with a private com-
pany. Indeed, Congress implicitly acknowledges that existing doc-
trine requires economic activity in its first “finding,” when it states: 
“The requirement regulates activity that is commercial and economic 
in nature: economic and financial decisions about how and when 
health care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased.”95 
So Congress is purporting to stay within existing Necessary and 
Proper Clause doctrine by claiming to regulate a class of economic 
activity. But what is that class of activity? It is “decisions about how 
and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is pur-
chased.” In this way, the statute speciously tries to convert inactiv-
ity into the “activity” of making a “decision.” By this reasoning, a 
“decision” not to take a job or not to sell your house or not to buy a 
Chevrolet is an “activity that is commercial and economic in na-
ture” that can be mandated by Congress.  
Perhaps for this reason, federal District Court Judge George 
Caram Steeh, in his ruling granting the government’s motion to 
dismiss the complaint brought against it by the Thomas More 
Law Center, subtly changes the claim. “While plaintiffs describe 
the Commerce Clause power as reaching economic activity, the 
government’s characterization of the Commerce Clause reaching 
economic decisions is more accurate.” 96  By this formulation, a 
                                                          
 
95 Id. § 1501(a)(2)(A) (emphases added).  
96 Thomas More Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-CV-11156, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107416 at 
*27 (E.D. Mich., Oct. 7 2010). 
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“decision” is not being reached because it is an “activity” under 
existing doctrine. Rather, the district court extended the power of 
Congress beyond the regulation of intrastate activity to enable it to 
reach “economic decisions.” By reformulating the government’s the-
ory in this way, and referring to this as an “issue of first impres-
sion,”97  Judge Steeh candidly exposes the novelty of the govern-
ment’s claim of power, and the need to reach beyond existing doc-
trine to justify it. 
However formulated, this shift from regulating activity to regu-
lating “decisions” to refrain from acting obliterates the well-known 
and intuitive distinction between acts and omissions. In the main, 
persons are responsible for their actions, not for their failure to act. 
Historically, one is not responsible for omissions to act unless one 
has a preexisting duty to act.98 Keep the word “duty” in mind, as it 
will be of critical importance in the discussion of whether the Su-
preme Court should expand the power of Congress still further un-
der the Necessary and Proper Clause. But for now, I will confine 
myself to the two problems that are most likely to stop the Court 
from accepting the idea that Congress may use its power over inter-
state commerce coupled with the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
compel persons to engage in economic activity.  
The first is that such a claim of power has never before been as-
serted by Congress, much less validated by the Supreme Court. It is 
literally unprecedented. Consider this: had the Commerce and 
Necessary and Proper Clauses been used to mandate individual 
conduct, every citizen would be able to recite all the mandates to 
which he or she must adhere upon penalty of a fine. Yet, apart 
from registering for the draft, serving on a jury, submitting a tax 
                                                          
 
97 Id. at *23. 
98 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 8 –86 (1999) (“There is no distinction more deeply 
rooted in the common law and more fundamental than that between misfeasance 
and nonfeasance. . . .” (quoting Bohlen, Francis, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a 
Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA, L. REV. 217, 219 (1908)); Id. at 87 (“[C]ases of simple 
bystander inaction or nonfeasance receive special treatment under the law. . . . The 
inquiry then turns to the question of whether it is possible to find some independent 
source for the duty to act.”).  
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return, and responding to the census, none of us can think of any 
such personal mandates. In Part V, I shall examine why these man-
dates differ in kind from a mandate to engage in economic activity.  
Which brings me to the second problem: Accepting this theory 
would open the door for an infinite variety of mandates in the fu-
ture. Under this theory of “activity,” Congress can mandate indi-
viduals do virtually anything at all on the grounds that the failure 
to engage in economic activity substantially affects interstate com-
merce. Therefore, it would effectively obliterate, once and for all, 
the enumerated powers scheme that even the New Deal Court did 
not abandon. 
Such a doctrine would run afoul of what the Constitution says 
about the powers of Congress, what the Supreme Court has consis-
tently said about the scope of those powers, and even what Chief 
Justice Marshall and Alexander Hamilton said about the scope of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Of course, unlike district and cir-
cuit courts that are bound to follow existing Supreme Court doc-
trines, the Supreme Court itself may move beyond what it has pre-
viously said about the scope of congressional powers. But, for rea-
sons I shall discuss in the Part VI, I sincerely doubt there are five 
votes today to take the power of Congress where it has never gone 
before. 
III. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE AND EXISTING TAX POWER 
DOCTRINE 
Unable to produce a single example of Congress having used its 
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clause powers in this way, 
defenders of the personal mandate began to shift grounds. On 
March 21st, the same day the House approved the Senate version 
of the legislation, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation 
released a 157-page “technical explanation” of the bill. 99  The 
word “commerce” appeared nowhere therein. Instead, the personal 
                                                          
 
99  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE 
PROVISIONS OF THE “RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,” AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION 
WITH THE “PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT,” JCX-18-10 (2010). 
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mandate is dubbed an “Excise Tax on Individuals Without Essential 
Health Benefits Coverage.”100 But while the enacted bill does im-
pose excise taxes on “high cost,” employer-sponsored insurance 
plans and “indoor tanning services,”101 the statute never describes 
the regulatory “penalty” it imposes for violating the mandate as an 
“excise tax.” It is expressly called a “penalty.”102 This shift will not 
work.  
A. Existing Tax Power Doctrine 
In the 1920s, when Congress wanted to discourage activity that 
was then deemed to be solely within the police power of states, it 
tried to penalize the activity using its tax power. In Bailey v. Drexel 
Furniture,103 the Supreme Court struck down such a penalty saying, 
“there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of 
the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a 
mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punish-
ment.”104 
Although the Court has never repudiated this principle,105 after 
the New Deal, it so broadly interpreted the commerce power that 
Congress no longer needed to obviate the limits on its regulatory 
                                                          
 
100 Id. at 31. 
101 I.R.C. §5000(B) (2010). 
102 I.R.C. §5000(A) (2010). 
103 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922). Bailey is also referred to as the 
Child Labor Tax Case. 
104 Id. at 38. 
105 See, e.g., Dept. of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994) 
(raising the issue of whether an exaction labeled a “tax” could in reality be a penalty 
for purposes of double jeopardy.) Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens reaffirmed 
Bailey’s principle that even an enactment labeled a “tax,” could be found to be a pen-
alty: 
 
We have cautioned against invalidating a tax simply because its enforcement 
might be oppressive or because the legislature’s motive was somehow suspect. 
A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 (1934). Yet we have also recog-
nized that “there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of 
the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere pen-
alty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment.” Id. at 46 (citing 
Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20, 38 (1922)). 
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powers by taxing rather than regulating activity. Thus, under the 
substantial effects doctrine, Congress may regulate or prohibit in-
trastate economic activity directly without invoking its taxation 
power. For this reason, the principle for which Bailey still stands 
became moribund. Yet precisely because a mandate to engage in 
economic activity has never been upheld by the Court, the tax 
power is once again being used to escape constitutional limits on 
Congress’s regulatory power.106 
Supporters of the mandate cite United States v. Kahriger, 107  a 
1953 case where the Court upheld a punitive tax on gambling by 
saying that “[u]nless there are provisions extraneous to any tax 
need, courts are without authority to limit the exercise of the taxing 
power.” 108  Yet the Court in Kahriger also cited Bailey with ap-
proval.109 How can both stances by the Court be reconciled? 
The key to understanding Kahriger is the proposition the Court 
there rejected: “it is said that Congress, under the pretense of exercis-
ing its power to tax has attempted to penalize illegal intrastate 
gambling through the regulatory features of the Act.”110 In other 
words, just as in Darby where the Court declined to look beyond 
Congress’s assertion that it was exercising its commerce power, the 
Court in Kahriger declined to look behind Congress’s assertion that 
it was exercising its tax power to see whether a measure was really 
a regulatory penalty. As the New Deal Court said in Sonzinsky v. 
United States (1937): “Inquiry into the hidden motives which may 
move Congress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon 
it is beyond the competency of courts.”111 But this principle cuts 
both ways. Neither has the Court ever looked behind Congress’s 
                                                          
 
106See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Constitutional Kreplach, 128 TAX NOTES 755 (2010) 
(asserting the tax power justification for the penalty enforcing the individual man-
date). 
107 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), overruled by Marchetti v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). 
108 Id. at 31. 
109 Id. at 31 n. 10. 
110 Id. at 24 (emphasis added). 
111 Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513–14 (1937). 
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inadequate assertion of its commerce power to speculate as to 
whether a measure could be justified as a tax.  
B. Applying Existing Doctrine to the Individual Insurance Mandate 
Congress simply did not enact the personal insurance mandate 
pursuant to its tax powers. To the contrary, the statute expressly 
says the mandate “regulates activity that is commercial and eco-
nomic in nature.”112 It never mentions the tax power. The penalty is 
simply there to enforce the health insurance requirement, which 
cannot possibly be construed as a tax. 
The Court in Sonzinisky also offered this observation: “The case 
is not one where the statute contains regulatory provisions related to a 
purported tax in such a way as has enabled this Court to say in other 
cases that the latter is a penalty resorted to as a means of enforcing 
the regulations.”113 But this exactly describes the relationship be-
tween the individual requirement and the so-called tax. The penalty 
is clearly being “resorted to as a means of enforcing”114 a regulation 
of commerce. The reasoning of Sonzinisky, therefore, strongly un-
dercuts the claim that the penalty in the Act is a tax.  
The constitutionality of the mandate must rise or fall as a regu-
lation. Its constitutionality is not affected or enhanced by its con-
junction with a penalty in the Internal Revenue Code. And if the 
health insurance requirement is unconstitutional because it exceeds 
the powers of Congress, then there is nothing for the penalty to en-
force. 
Moreover, unlike Sonzinisky, the penalty does not even purport 
to be a tax. It is called a “penalty.” Although the penalty was in-
serted into the Internal Revenue Code, Congress then expressly 
severed the penalty from the normal enforcement mechanisms of 
the tax code. The failure to pay the penalty “shall not be subject to 
                                                          
 
112 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(a)(2)(A), 
124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
113 Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513 (emphasis added). 
114 Id. 
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any criminal prosecution or penalty with respect to such failure.”115 
Nor shall the IRS “file notice of lien with respect to any property of 
a taxpayer by reason of any failure to pay the penalty imposed by 
this section,”116 or impose a “levy on any such property with re-
spect to such failure.”117  All of these restrictions undermine the 
claim that, because the penalty is inserted into the Internal Revenue 
Code, that it is a garden variety tax.  
                                                          
We are not without guidance from the Supreme Court about 
the difference between a tax and a penalty. In United States v. La 
Franca, the Court offered the following distinction: “A tax is an en-
forced contribution to provide for the support of government; a 
penalty, as the word is here used, is an exaction imposed by statute 
as punishment for an unlawful act.” 118  In the words of Justice 
Souter, relying on La Franca, “if the concept of penalty means any-
thing, it means punishment for an unlawful act or omission, and a 
punishment for an unlawful omission is what this exaction is.”119 
By contrast, “a tax is a pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or 
property for the purpose of supporting the Government.”120 Justice 
Stone described taxes as “pecuniary burdens laid upon individuals 
or their property, regardless of their consent, for the purpose of de-
fraying the expenses of government or of undertakings authorized 
by it.”121  
Considered apart from the penalty, it is obvious that the indi-
vidual insurance mandate cannot have been imposed to raise reve-
nue and therefore be justified under the power of Congress to tax. 
The mandate raises no revenue for the government whatsoever. To 
the contrary, it commands that citizens provide revenue to private 
insurance companies. But if the mandate is not an exercise of the tax 
 
115 I.R.C. §5000A(g)(2)(A) (West 2010). 
116 I.R.C. §5000A(g)(2)(B)(i) (West 2010). 
117 I.R.C. §5000A(g)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2010). 
118 United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931). 
119 United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 224 
(1996). 
120 Id. (quoting New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483, 492 (1906)). 
121 City of New York v. Feiring, 313 U. S. 283, 287 (1941) (Stone, J.). 
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power, and is not independently constitutional under the Com-
merce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, then it is unconstitutional 
and there is nothing for the “penalty” in the “Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act” to enforce. 
Given that the mandate cannot possibly be a tax, the argument 
must be that the “penalty,” standing alone, is a tax. But was the 
“penalty” enforcing the individual mandate enacted with “the pur-
pose of supporting the government,” or was it instead enacted as 
“punishment for an unlawful . . . omission”? All of the findings in 
support of the requirement attempted to justify it exclusively as a 
regulation of commerce. Nowhere was the purpose of the penalty 
separately identified as raising revenue.  
To the contrary, in Section 9000 et seq of Title IX of the Act, enti-
tled, “Revenue Provisions,”122 Congress expressly identified all the 
revenue raising provisions therein including, for example, the “Ex-
cise tax on high cost employer-sponsored health coverage.”123 We 
know this list was exhaustive because its purpose was to score the 
cost of the Act when Congress was laboring to bring its price tag 
below one trillion dollars. The more revenue it could list in Section 
9000 et seq, the lower the cost. Yet, the penalty enforcing the man-
date is nowhere listed as a source of revenue. 
In short, the “penalty” is explicitly justified as a penalty to co-
erce compliance with a regulation of economic activity and not as a 
tax. None of the purposes for the penalty involve raising revenue 
and the section of the Act identifying revenue provisions overlooks 
the penalty. So while Congress need not specify expressly what 
power it may be exercising, there is simply no authority for the 
Court to recharacterize a regulation as a tax when doing so is con-
trary to the express and actual regulatory purpose of Congress.  
We can summarize this analysis as follows. Under existing tax 
power doctrine: (1) the health insurance mandate does not fit the 
definition of a tax; (2) when considering whether the penalty is a 
tax, courts will not look behind the fact that the statute described it 
                                                          
 
122 Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 9001–9023, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
123 I.R.C. §4980. 
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as a “penalty” to enforce a regulation of commerce to see if the 
“penalty” was really a tax; (3) if a court did look behind the labels of 
“penalty” and “requirement”—as the government would need for it 
to do—it would then have to decide whether the purpose of the 
exaction was to raise revenues, or whether it genuinely operates 
instead as a penalty for failing to adhere to the requirement.  
So whether we stick with form or move behind the form to in-
quire about the substance of the measure, under existing doctrine 
neither the mandate to buy health insurance, nor the penalty enforc-
ing it, is a tax.124 Once again, defenders of the mandate are making 
an unprecedented claim. Never before has the Court looked behind 
Congress’s unconstitutional assertion of its commerce power to see 
if a measure could have been justified as a tax. For that matter, 
never before has a “tax” penalty been used to mandate, rather than 
discourage or prohibit, economic activity. 
But the government’s tax power theory is far more radical than 
the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clause theory precisely 
because the Supreme Court has generally deferred to any invoca-
tion of the tax power to raise revenue to spend for the general wel-
fare. This normal deference is why the mandate’s defenders shifted 
the argument from the Commerce Clause to the tax power. Yet if its 
theory is accepted, Congress would be able to penalize or mandate 
any activity by anyone in the country, provided it limited the sanc-
tion to a fine enforced by the Internal Revenue Service.  
This is a congressional power unknown and unheard of before 
2010. It would effectively grant Congress a general police power. 
And we know what existing doctrine says about such a power: 
“The Constitution . . . withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police 
                                                          
 
124 Of course, if it is a tax, then it may be neither an income nor an excise tax but in-
stead a direct tax on individuals. If so, then because it is not equally apportioned 
among the several states, it would be an unconstitutional tax. See Steven J. Willis & 
Nakku Chung, Constitutional Decapitation and Healthcare, 128 TAX NOTES 169 (2010). 
But I seriously doubt the Court will ever reach this question given (a) the text of the 
statute, (b) what it has previously said about examining the true motives of Congress 
and the difference between and tax and a penalty, and (c) the radical implications of 
accepting the government’s argument. 
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power that would authorize enactment of every type of legisla-
tion.” 125  Such has been the Supreme Court’s position from the 
Founding until today.  
IV. ESSENTIAL TO A BROADER REGULATION OF COMMERCE 
Confronted with the difficulties of justifying the mandate under 
existing substantial effects doctrine or the tax power, the govern-
ment has pressed a third argument: that the mandate is justified 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause because it is an essential 
part of a broader regulatory scheme.126 For example, the new re-
quirement that insurance companies accept all applicants regardless 
of their pre-existing illnesses is infeasible unless everyone is forced 
into the insurance pool before they get sick.  
Their reasoning has three steps: (a) if Congress has the power to 
regulate insurance companies under its commerce power—as the 
Court so ruled in South-Eastern Underwriters127—and (b) it can use 
this power to impose regulations banning pre-existing conditions, 
then (c) it becomes necessary to mandate that everyone buy insur-
ance. Hence, although not itself a regulation of commerce, the man-
date is a necessary and proper means to exercise Congress’s power 
over interstate commerce. 
The government’s argument is based on dicta in United States v. 
Lopez. In his opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the Gun 
Free School Zone Act was not “an essential part of a larger regula-
tion of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be 
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.”128 This prin-
ciple was mentioned again by Justice Stevens writing for the major-
ity in Raich.129 As we already saw, because the activity in Raich was 
                                                          
 
125 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995). 
126 See Reply Memo in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 14, Virginia v. 
Sebelius, Civil Action No. 3:10CV188-HEH (E.D.VA. Aug. 2, 2010). 
127 United States v. Se. Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
128 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.  
129 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24–25 (2005) (Stevens, J.) (The “classification 
[of marijuana as a Schedule I substance], unlike the discrete prohibition established 
by the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, was merely one of many ‘essential part[s] 
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deemed by the Court to be “economic” in nature, Justice Stevens’ 
assertion of this principle did not entail it would apply to none-
conomic activity. 
That Congress could reach intrastate noneconomic activity un-
der this theory was propounded by Justice Scalia in his concurring 
opinion in Raich: “Congress may regulate even noneconomic local 
activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regu-
lation of interstate commerce.”130 And he then grounded this prin-
ciple in the Necessary and Proper Clause. “As we implicitly ac-
knowledged in Lopez, . . . Congress’s authority to enact laws neces-
sary and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce is not lim-
ited to laws directed against economic activities that have a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.”131 In this way, Justice Scalia 
affirmed the understanding that the line of cases upholding the 
power of Congress to reach wholly intrastate activity are based on 
the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Of course, a majority of the Supreme Court has yet to adopt Jus-
tice Scalia’s theory as a way of reaching intrastate economic and 
noneconomic activity. But to justify the health insurance mandate, 
the Supreme Court would have to go beyond anything previously 
written by Justice Scalia, much less by Chief Justice Rehnquist or 
Justice Stevens. The Supreme Court would have to rule that Con-
gress can regulate wholly intrastate inactivity when doing so is 
deemed by Congress to be essential to a more general regulation of 
commerce.  
There is nothing in either Lopez or Raich to warrant the addi-
tional step beyond current doctrine to allow Congress to compel 
that persons engage in economic activity when doing so is essential 
to a broader regulation of commerce. (And in Part V, I will explain 
why any such extension would be improper.) In Raich, both Justice 
                                                                                                                         
 
of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be 
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.’”). 
130 Id. at 37. 
131 Id. at 36; see also id. at 35 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our cases show that the regula-
tion of intrastate activities may be necessary to and proper for the regulation of inter-
state commerce. . . .”). 
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Stevens and Justice Scalia were attempting to deal with a rather 
technical issue that arises in certain Commerce Clause cases. As Jus-
tice Thomas noticed in his dissent,132 whereas both Lopez and Morri-
son were facial challenges, Raich involved the constitutionality of 
the C.S.A. as applied to intrastate use of marijuana for medical use as 
authorized by state law, on the ground that this subset class was 
noneconomic.133  
Once one concedes the facial constitutionality of Congress’s 
power over a statutorily defined class of activities, however, as was 
conceded in Raich with respect to the Controlled Substances Act, 
how is one to define the relevant subclass of intrastate activities that 
Congress may reach? Just why is the relevant class the intrastate 
possession and cultivation of marijuana for medical use as author-
ized by state law? Why is it not the intrastate cultivation and pos-
session of marijuana for medical use, regardless of whether the state 
has authorized it? Or why is it not the intrastate cultivation of mari-
juana for recreational use as authorized by state law?  
This is a serious conceptual problem with as-applied Commerce 
Clause challenges. I believe this was the problem that Justice Scalia 
was trying to address in his concurring opinion when he invoked 
the Necessary and Proper Clause to explain why Congress could 
sometimes reach even noneconomic activity as a means of regulat-
ing commerce that was indeed interstate. Justice Scalia would defer 
                                                          
 
132 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 61 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Because respondents do not 
challenge on its face the CSA’s ban on marijuana, our adjudication of their as-applied 
challenge casts no doubt on this Court's practice in United States v. Lopez and 
United States v. Morrison. In those cases, we held that Congress, in enacting the 
statutes at issue, had exceeded its Article I powers.” (citations omitted)).  
133 See id. at 15 (Stevens, J.) (“Respondents in this case do not dispute that passage 
of the CSA . . . was well within Congress’ commerce power. Nor do they contend 
that any provision or section of the CSA amounts to an unconstitutional exercise of 
congressional authority. Rather, respondents’ challenge is actually quite limited; they 
argue that the CSA’s categorical prohibition of the manufacture and possession of 
marijuana as applied to the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for 
medical purposes pursuant to California law exceeds Congress’ authority under the 
Commerce Clause.”); Id. at 59 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Respondents are correct 
that the CSA exceeds Congress' commerce power as applied to their conduct, which 
is purely intrastate and noncommercial.”). 
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to Congress’s judgment that, as in Wickard, it needed to draw a cir-
cle around a class of activity that includes some intrastate none-
conomic activity.  
In this regard, Raich truly does represent the same type of prob-
lem dealt with in Wickard. Once it is conceded that Congress has 
power under the Commerce Clause over a class of interstate activi-
ties—whether regulating the interstate price of wheat or prohibiting 
the interstate commerce in marijuana—then, according to Justice 
Scalia, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, it can reach even 
intrastate activity of the same kind if, in its judgment, the failure to 
reach this activity will undercut its ability to regulate interstate 
commerce. The need to address the problem of defining the rele-
vant class of activity also explains why Justice Stevens’ opinion 
stressed the fungible nature of marijuana, and even included the 
production of a “fungible commodity” in his definition of com-
merce.134  
Properly understood, then, both Wickard and Raich deal with an 
exceedingly narrow problem that arises with as-applied Commerce 
Clause challenges: defining the relevant class of activities for pur-
poses of the challenge. Had either court fully appreciated the prob-
lem it faced, it would not have had to strain so mightily to reach its 
results.135 In his concurrence, Justice Scalia came the closest to the 
mark, but his analysis would have been tighter and more con-
strained had he confined himself to as-applied challenges to the 
regulation of the intrastate subset of a class of activities that are 
largely interstate in nature.  
                                                          
 
134 Id. at 22 (Stevens, J.) (“[A]s in Wickard, when it enacted comprehensive legisla-
tion to regulate the interstate market in a fungible commodity, Congress was acting 
well within its authority to ‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper ‘to 
regulate Commerce . . . among the Several States.’” (citations omitted)). 
135 Nor would this difficulty arise if Nick Rosenkranz is right that there should be 
no “as-applied” Commerce Clause challenges given that the subject of the Commerce 
Clause is Congress and thus the proper constitutional question is whether Congress 
exceeds its authority when it enacts a statute, not when the statute is applied. See 
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 
1273–79 (2010). 
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In contrast with Raich (and Wickard), the lawsuits against the 
individual mandate are all facial challenges to the “class of activity” 
defined in the statute. No court is being asked to carve out a none-
conomic subset of the class of activities that Congress chose to regu-
late. No one is conceding that the bulk of this class is within the 
power of Congress to reach. So neither the majority opinion in 
Raich, nor Justice Scalia’s concurrence, are directly on point. I fully 
expect that, if confronted with a challenge to the individual man-
date, Justice Scalia will appreciate the difference between the class 
of inactivity being reached by the Act, and the subclass of none-
conomic activity prohibited by the C.S.A.  
If Justice Scalia’s theory is considered to be existing law, it fails 
even to hint at a power of Congress to reach inactivity, and man-
date economic activity, as a means of regulating interstate com-
merce. For that matter, neither does Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dicta 
in Lopez that Congress can reach activity when doing so is “an es-
sential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the 
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity 
were regulated.”136  Therefore, unless the Supreme Court is pre-
pared to use alchemy to convert a “decision” not to act into activity, 
to uphold the individual mandate would require going beyond 
both existing Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine 
and Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Raich.  
If and when a majority of the Court does accept Justice Scalia’s 
“essential to a broader regulatory scheme” rationale for reaching 
intrastate noneconomic activity, some doctrine limiting “necessity” 
under this theory will be required. The distinction between eco-
nomic and noneconomic activity would obviously provide no limit 
to this doctrine. The whole purpose for his concurring opinion was 
to question the usefulness of that distinction in dealing with the 
problems posed by Raich. Without some judicially administrable 
limiting doctrine, however, the fear expressed in Lopez and Morrison 
                                                          
 
136 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (emphasis added). 
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that Congress would then possess a general police power would be 
realized.  
The distinction between activity and inactivity provides the 
same type of judicially administrable limiting doctrine for what is 
“necessary” to execute the commerce power under an “essential to 
a broader regulatory scheme” theory as the economic-noneconomic 
distinction provides for the substantial effects doctrine. Recall that 
the economic-noneconomic distinction had not previously been dis-
cussed in the substantial effects doctrine cases when Chief Justice 
Rehnquist looked back at these cases to identify this commonality. 
Now that Congress has, for the first time, sought to reach inactivity, 
all the Supreme Court need do is look back at its Necessary and 
Proper Clause cases to see that every singe one involved the regula-
tion of activity, not inactivity. 
Limiting Congress to regulating or prohibiting activity under 
both the substantial effects and the essential to a broader regulatory 
scheme doctrines would serve the same purpose as the economic-
noneconomic distinction. Such a formal limitation would help as-
sure that exercises of the Necessary and Proper Clause to execute 
the commerce power would be truly incidental to that power and 
not be remote. Doing nothing at all involves not entering into a lit-
erally infinite set of economic transactions. Giving a discretionary 
power over this set to Congress when it deems it essential to a regu-
lation of interstate commerce would give Congress a plenary and 
unlimited police power over inaction that is typically far removed 
from interstate commerce.  
Of course, like the distinction between economic and none-
conomic activity, the activity-inactivity distinction would not per-
fectly distinguish between incidental and remote exercises of im-
plied powers. But, however imperfect, some such line must be 
drawn to preserve Article I’s scheme of limited and enumerated 
powers. Because accepting the Government’s theory in this case 
would effectively demolish that scheme, the Government’s theory is 
unconstitutional.  
In its current briefs, the Government implicitly acknowledges 
this problem by its attempt to distinguish the health insurance 
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business as “unique” in a variety of respects and thereby appear to 
be providing a limiting principle.137 But examining the substance of 
the law in question is precisely the sort of inquiry into the “more or 
less necessity” of a measure that has been rejected by the Supreme 
Court since McCulloch. Once the power to mandate economic activ-
ity is recognized here, the Court will refuse to examine future man-
dates on a case-by-case basis to see if they are factually like the 
health insurance mandate. Therefore, if this mandate allowed, Con-
gress will henceforth have the power to impose mandates at its dis-
cretion regardless of the “uniqueness” of the market in question. 
The government’s attempt to limit the doctrine by its factual asser-
tions is chimerical. 
To sum up, the distinction between economic and noneconomic 
activity now provides a judicially administrable limit to the “neces-
sary” prong of the Necessary and Proper Clause power to reach 
wholly intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate com-
merce. This limiting doctrine was discovered by looking back to all 
previous substantial effects cases to notice a commonality among 
them. The “essential to a broader regulatory” theory of the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause likewise requires a limiting doctrine that 
can be identified by looking back at all previous cases to see that, to 
date, the Court has only sanctioned Congress reaching intrastate 
activity.138  
In Chief Justice Rehnquist’s words, “the pattern is clear.”139  
Under the “necessary” element of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
                                                          
 
137 See, e.g., Brief for Defendant at 17, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT (N.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2010); Brief for Defendant at 24, 
Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT (N.D. 
Fla. Nov. 4, 2010). 
138 In his opinion, Judge Vinson viewed the activity-inactivity distinction as limit-
ing the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health and Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, slip op. at 39–44 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 
31, 2010). That the substantial effects doctrine was based on the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, however, suggests that the activity-inactivity distinction can also be 
viewed as restricting the “necessary” prong of the Necessary and Proper Clause in 
the context of the commerce power. It is justifiable on the same grounds as was the 
economic-noneconomic distinction, and identified in the same manner. 
139 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (Rehnquist, C.J.). 
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Congress may only regulate intrastate activity, either (a) because 
such activity is economic in nature and substantially affects inter-
state commerce or, (b) because, whether such intrastate activity is 
economic or noneconomic in nature, reaching it is essential to a 
broader regulation of interstate commerce.  
V. WHY THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS ALSO IMPROPER 
A. What the Supreme Court Has Said About “Proper” 
The government’s theory that Congress can mandate that peo-
ple engage in economic activity when doing so is essential to a 
regulatory scheme only gets it past the requirement that the man-
date be necessary to the execution of the commerce power. But the 
inquiry would not end there. The Necessary and Proper Clause re-
quires that laws be “proper” as well. Assuming the individual 
mandate is deemed essential to a broader regulation of interstate 
commerce and therefore is “necessary,” is it also a “proper” means 
to the end of regulating interstate commerce?  
In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall provided the following 
rule of law to guide the application of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter 
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”140 The requirement 
that a law be “plainly adapted to that end,” concerns the matter of 
means-ends fit, discussed above, when assessing a measure’s neces-
sity. The italicized portions concern the requirement that a means 
that may be conducive to an enumerated end and, therefore, neces-
sary must also be appropriate or proper. First, such a means must 
not be prohibited, and second it must be consistent with the letter 
and spirit of the constitution.  
Of course, because mandating economic activity on the grounds 
that it is essential to the regulation of commerce is unprecedented, 
there are no judicial opinions directly addressing whether such an 
                                                          
 
140 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (emphasis added).  
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economic mandate is “within the letter and spirit of the Constitu-
tion.” But neither has the Supreme Court been entirely silent on the 
issue of the propriety of means when Congress is seeking to exer-
cise its commerce power. As it happens, the means it held to be im-
proper was a mandate on state governments.  
In 1992, Congress used its commerce power to mandate that 
any state that refused to enter into interstate compacts to dispose of 
nuclear waste must take title to the nuclear waste itself. In New York 
v. United States,141 the Court held that this mandate constituted un-
constitutional commandeering of state legislatures. In her opinion 
for the Court, Justice O’Connor explained that “the Constitution has 
never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to re-
quire the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”142 
She characterized this as unconstitutional “commandeering,” a term 
she took from the 1981 case of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n.:143 “Congress may not simply ‘commandeer the 
legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to 
enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’”144 In New York, 
the Court held that “‘the Act commandeers the legislative processes 
of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a fed-
eral regulatory program,’ an outcome that has never been under-
stood to lie within the authority conferred upon Congress by the 
Constitution.”145 
Then, in 1997, Congress used its commerce power to mandate 
that local sheriffs run background checks on gun buyers. In Printz v. 
United States,146 the Supreme Court held that this too constituted 
improper “commandeering” of state executive branch officials. In 
his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia identified a principle of state 
sovereignty underlying several provisions of the Constitution. 
These included the prohibition on any involuntary reduction or 
                                                          
 
141 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992). 
142 Id. at 162 (O’Connor, J.).  
143 Hodel v. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981). 
144 New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (quoting Hodel). 
145 Id. at 176 (quoting Hodel, 452 at 288) (emphasis added). 
146 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1996). 
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combination of a State’s territory in Art. IV, §3; the Judicial Power 
Clause in Art. III, §2, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause in 
Art. IV, §2, “which speak of the ‘Citizens’ of the States” 147 ; the 
amendment provision in Article V, “which requires the votes of 
three-fourths of the States to amend the Constitution”148; and the 
Guarantee Clause in Art. IV, §4.149  
This doctrine barring the commandeering of states has, how-
ever, come to be associated primarily with the Tenth Amendment. 
“[R]esidual state sovereignty was also implicit, of course, in the 
Constitution’s conferral upon Congress of not all governmental 
powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones, Art. I, §8,” wrote Jus-
tice Scalia, “which implication was rendered express by the Tenth 
Amendment’s assertion that ‘[t]he powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.’”150  
From the existence of residual state sovereignty expressed in 
the Tenth Amendment, Justice Scalia concluded that the “Federal 
Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to 
address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or 
those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a fed-
eral regulatory program.”151 Such commandeering is “fundamen-
tally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sover-
eignty.”152  
In his response to the claim that this mandate on states was jus-
tified under the Necessary and Proper Clause as a means of effectu-
ating its commerce power, Justice Scalia memorably described the 
clause as “the last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires con-
gressional action.”153 He then explained: “When a ‘Law . . . for car-
rying into Execution’ the Commerce Clause violates the principle of 
                                                          
 
147 Id. at 919. 
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150 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X). 
151 Id. at 935. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 923. 
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state sovereignty reflected in” the Tenth Amendment and other 
constitutional provisions, “it is not a ‘Law . . . proper for carrying 
into Execution the Commerce Clause,’ and is thus, in the words of 
The Federalist, ‘merely [an] act of usurpation’ which ‘deserves to be 
treated as such.’”154 In this way, Justice Scalia made clear that, how-
ever necessary Congress might deem it to be, imposing mandates 
on state legislatures and executive officers was an improper means 
to the end of regulating commerce among the several states. 
Nor has Justice Scalia backed away from this position. In his 
concurring opinion in Raich, referring to the portions of Chief Jus-
tice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch emphasized above, he wrote: 
“These phrases are not merely hortatory. For example, cases such as 
[Printz and New York] affirm that a law is not ‘proper for carrying 
into Execution the Commerce Clause’ ‘[w]hen [it] violates [a consti-
tutional] principle of state sovereignty.’”155  But this principle did 
not apply in Raich, he said, because “neither respondents nor the 
dissenters suggest any violation of state sovereignty of the sort that 
would render this regulation ‘inappropriate’ . . . ”156 
The Supreme Court’s most recent consideration of the meaning 
of the Necessary and Proper Clause is United States v. Comstock,157 
which upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute allowing the 
civil commitment of sexually dangerous criminals after the expira-
tion of their sentence for the commission of a federal crime. While 
it gives the Necessary and Proper Clause an expansive reading, 
                                                          
 
154 Id. at 923–24. (citations omitted). In support of this conclusion, Justice Scalia 
then cited Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993). Randy Beck 
disputes both Justice Scalia’s and Lawson & Granger’s reading of “proper” on 
originalist grounds, but this issue is beyond the scope of this article’s focus on exist-
ing doctrine. See Beck, supra note 39, at 626–48. Cf. Randy E. Barnett, The Original 
Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 185, 188–215 (2003) 
(discussing original meaning of “necessary”). As suggested in Part I, both the regula-
tions imposed on insurance companies, and the insurance mandate imposed on in-
dividuals, most likely exceed the original scope of the enumerated powers of Con-
gress. 
155 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
156 Id. at 41. 
157 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
2010]    Commandeering the People   625 
Comstock offers little, if any, support for the individual mandate. 
Justice Breyer’s opinion, purported to be narrow, identifies five fac-
tors that led the Court to its conclusion,158 and may well have been 
so written to attract the vote of Chief Justice Roberts. Even so, Jus-
tices Kennedy and Alito joined only in the result. In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Kennedy advocated enhanced scrutiny of the con-
nection between means and ends when considering claims of power 
under the Commerce Clause,159 strongly signaling that his joining 
the majority in Raich did not represent his abandonment of his prior 
stance in Lopez.160 
But for present purposes, the most important thing about Com-
stock is that it said nothing whatsoever about the propriety of the 
means—incarceration—employed by the statute. Instead, it solely 
concerned whether there was a direct enough connection between 
the statute and an enumerated power. The current substantial ef-
fects doctrine requires, at minimum, that the intrastate activity be-
ing reached is economic in nature and, therefore, likely to be suffi-
ciently connected to interstate commerce. Comstock simply does not 
address the issue of "proper." 
Comstock is also noteworthy for Justice Thomas’s dissenting 
opinion, not only for what he says, but because it was joined by 
Justice Scalia, which is a rarity in Commerce Clause cases.161 In 
his dissent, Justice Thomas reaffirmed the McCulloch standard 
for assessing propriety: “The means Congress selects will be 
deemed ‘necessary’ if they are ‘appropriate’ and ‘plainly adapted’ 
                                                          
 
158 See id. at 1956-64. 
159 See id. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring): 
Raich, Lopez, and Hodel were all Commerce Clause cases [that] require a tangi-
ble link to commerce, not a mere conceivable rational relation, as in Lee Optical. 
. . . The rational basis referred to in the Commerce Clause context is a demon-
strated link in fact, based on empirical demonstration. While undoubtedly 
deferential, this may well be different from the rational-basis test as Lee Optical 
described it. 
160 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
161 Justice Scalia did not join Justice Thomas’s originalist concurring opinions in 
Lopez and Morrison and he was on the opposite side of Raich. 
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to the exercise of an enumerated power, and ‘proper’ if they are not 
otherwise ‘prohibited’ by the Constitution and not ‘[in]consistent’ 
with its ‘letter and spirit.’”162 He concluded his dissent by quoting 
from Justice Scalia’s opinion in Printz: “Not long ago, this Court 
described the Necessary and Proper Clause as ‘the last, best hope of 
those who defend ultra vires congressional action.’”163 And he la-
mented the fact that the majority opinion in Comstock “breathes new 
life into that Clause, and—the Court’s protestations to the contrary 
notwithstanding . . . comes perilously close to transforming the 
Necessary and Proper Clause into a basis for the federal police 
power that ‘we always have rejected.’”164  
So too would the use of the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
uphold the individual mandate.  
B. Why the Individual Mandate is an Improper Means to the Regulation of 
Interstate Commerce 
Because an individual mandate is an unprecedented means of 
executing the commerce power, the Supreme Court has never 
opined on whether it is “proper.” When the Supreme Court has 
been silent on a question, it is time to turn to the Constitution itself 
to see if it provides any guidance on the propriety of the govern-
ment’s novel claim of Congressional power.165   
As we have seen, the anti-commandeering cases that limit the 
commerce power of Congress were ultimately grounded by the Su-
                                                          
 
162 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1971–72. Notice that Justice Thomas reads “appropriate” 
as relating to the necessity of a mean rather than its propriety. Nothing of substance 
turns on whether this is correct. 
163 Id. at 1983 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
164 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting his concurring opinion in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
584).  
165 In his opinion, Judge Vinson holds that the individual mandate is an “im-
proper” means of executing the commerce power because the rationales by which it 
is allegedly justified would inevitably undermine the scheme of limited and enumer-
ated powers, and thereby violate the letter and spirit of the Constitution. See Florida 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, slip op. at 56–63 
(N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2010). The analysis in this section can be viewed as providing an-
other independent reason to conclude that the mandate is improper. 
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preme Court in the text of the Tenth Amendment. Yet the letter of 
the Tenth Amendment is not limited to states. It says that the “pow-
ers not delegated by the Constitution to the United States . . . are 
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people”.166  As Justice 
Thomas has written, the Tenth Amendment “avoids taking any po-
sition on the division of power between the state governments and 
the people of the States”167—a position he reasserted just last term 
in his dissenting opinion in Comstock in which Justice Scalia 
joined.168 In this way, the text of the Tenth Amendment recognizes 
popular as well as state sovereignty.  
The Supreme Court has not been silent on the sovereignty of 
the people.  In Chisholm v. Georgia,169 its first great constitutional 
case, the Supreme Court examined the question of whether states 
were immune from being sued by individual citizens in federal 
court. By a vote of four to one, the Supreme Court rejected Geor-
gia’s claim of sovereign immunity and affirmed the power of an 
individual to sue a state for breach of contract in federal court.  
To evaluate Georgia’s claim, the Justices were compelled to ex-
amine the concept of sovereignty and its relationship to the power 
of an individual to sue a state to enforce his individual rights. As 
Justice Cushing observed: “The rights of individuals and the justice 
due to them, are as dear and precious as those of States. Indeed the 
latter are founded upon the former; and the great end and object of 
them must be to secure and support the rights of individuals, or 
else vain is Government.”170  
                                                          
 
166 U.S. CONST. amend. X. (emphasis added) (The Commonwealth of Virginia ini-
tially refused to ratify the Tenth Amendment because it thought the addition of these 
words to the proposal that its ratification convention had recommended to Congress 
vitiated the protection of state sovereignty. See Randy E. Barnett, Kurt Lash’s Majori-
tarian Difficulty: A Response to A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 937, 952–53 (2008) (describing Virginia’s objection to this language 
and that of its U.S. Senators)).  
167 U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 848 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
168 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct 1949, 1971 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
169 Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (2 Dall.) (1793). 
170 Id. at 468. 
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Chief Justice John Jay—former president of the Continental 
Congress, former ambassador to Spain and France, and one of the 
original co-authors of the Federalist papers—expounded on the na-
ture of sovereignty. “[T]he sovereignty of the nation is in the people 
of the nation, and the residuary sovereignty of each State in the 
people of each State. . . . [A]t the Revolution, the sovereignty de-
volved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the coun-
try. . . .”171 Later in his opinion he referred to “this great and glori-
ous principle, that the people are the sovereign of this country,”172 
and he referred to “the people,” not collectively, but as “fellow citi-
zens and joint sovereigns.”173 
Justice James Wilson—member of the committee of detail at the 
Philadelphia convention that selected the actual wording of the 
Constitution— joined Chief Justice Jay in locating sovereignty in the 
individual citizen. “The only reason, I believe, why a free man is 
bound by human laws, is, that he binds himself” and he thereby 
“becomes amenable to the Courts of Justice, which are formed and 
authorised by those laws.”174 Wilson then asked, “[i]f one free man, 
an original sovereign, may do all this; why may not an aggregate of 
free men, a collection of original sovereigns, do this likewise?”175 For 
Wilson, like Jay, whatever sovereignty states enjoyed was deriva-
tive of the ultimate sovereignty of the individual person. 
Of course, the Court’s decision in Chisholm was effectively re-
versed by the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, which barred 
suits against states in federal court by citizens of other states.176 
And, since the 1890 case of Hans v. Louisiana, a majority of the Su-
preme Court has “understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand 
not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it 
                                                          
 
171 Id. at 471. 
172 Id. at 479. 
173 Id. (emphasis added). 
174 Id. at 456. 
175 Id. (emphases added). 
176 See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against 
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confirms.”177  In the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist in Seminole 
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, this presupposition was that, “each State is 
a sovereign entity in our federal system.”178 
But in affirming the underlying principle of state sovereignty 
within the federal system, the Supreme Court has never repudiated 
its early affirmation of popular sovereignty in Chisholm. In Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins,179  the Supreme court reaffirmed that “in our system, 
while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of govern-
ment, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for 
whom all government exists and acts.”  
If commandeering the states is an improper means of executing 
a federal power under the “letter” of the Tenth Amendment “and 
spirit of the Constitution,” might not commandeering the people be 
improper as well? Put another way, if imposing mandates on state 
legislatures and executives intrudes improperly into state sover-
eignty, might mandating the people improperly infringe on popular 
sovereignty?  
As Lon Fuller and other contracts scholars have recognized, by 
forming a contract persons employ a private law-making power. 
The “power of the individual to effect changes in his legal relations 
with others is comparable to the power of a legislature. It is, in fact, 
only a kind of political prejudice which causes us to use the word 
‘law’ in one case and not in the other. . . .”180   Mandating that indi-
viduals exercise their private legislative power is as fundamental an 
intrusion into popular sovereignty as mandating that states employ 
their legislative powers violates state sovereignty.  
Recall that, in Printz, Justice Scalia identified several sections of 
the Constitution that presupposed the principle expressed in the 
                                                                                                                         
 
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any 
Foreign State.”). 
177 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
178 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.). 
179 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (Matthews, J.). 
180 Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800–07 (1941). 
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Tenth Amendment.181 As it happens, the text of the Constitution 
also contains several express prohibitions on commandeering the 
people. Persons may not be mandated to quarter soldiers in their 
homes in time of peace,182 to testify against themselves in a criminal 
case,183 or to labor for another.184 Although private property may be 
taken “for public use” if just compensation is made, it may not be 
commandeered for private use.185  
These express prohibitions on commandeering the people sig-
nal that mandates are different than regulations that tell persons 
who choose to engage in economic activity how they must do so — 
or that prohibit certain activities altogether. To see why, consider 
the duties the federal government does impose on the people: regis-
ter for the draft and serve if called, sit on a jury, fill out a census 
form, and file a tax return. None of these duties are imposed via 
Congress’s power to regulate economic behavior. Instead, all have 
traditionally been considered fundamental duties that each person 
owes to the government by virtue of American citizenship or resi-
dency. Each of these duties can be considered essential to the very 
existence of the government, not merely convenient to the regula-
tion of commerce.  
Consider the duty to serve in the military. The Pennsylvania 
constitution of 1776 declared that “every member of society hath a 
right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property, 
and therefore is bound to contribute his proportion towards the 
expense of that protection, and yield his personal service when nec-
essary, or an equivalent thereto.”186 In upholding the constitutional-
                                                          
 
181 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161–62 (1992); Hodel v. Va. Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
182 See U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
183 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
184 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
185 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
186  PA. CONST. art. 8 (1776), reprinted in, 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATE 3081, 
3083 (Thorpe ed., 1909); see also VT. CONST. C. 1, art. 9 (1777), reprinted in, 6 THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER 
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATE 4747, 3740 (using identical language); N.Y CONST. art. 
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ity of the national draft during World War I, the Supreme Court 
said: “It may not be doubted that the very conception of a just gov-
ernment and its duty to the citizen includes the reciprocal obliga-
tion of the citizen to render military service in case of need, and the 
right to compel it.”187  
The Court then summarily rejected a Thirteenth Amendment 
objection to the draft on the ground that it was “unable to conceive 
upon what theory the exaction by government from the citizen of 
the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the 
defense of the rights and honor of the nation, as the result of a war 
declared by the great representative body of the people, can be said 
to be the imposition of involuntary servitude. . . .”188 This assertion 
of the Thirteenth Amendment in the draft case demonstrates its 
anti-commandeering nature. For, unless the Court could find an 
affirmative duty of citizenship on which to base conscription, the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s general prohibition on commandeering 
the labor of the people would clearly apply to the draft. 
Can a duty to purchase health insurance from a private com-
pany possibly be justified as being on a par with these other tradi-
tionally recognized fundamental duties of citizenship? Put another 
way, does the reason why a mandate is a proper means for carrying 
into execution the power of Congress to raise and support an army 
also justify imposing economic mandates on the people that are 
convenient to its regulation of commerce among the several states? 
The propriety of the insurance mandate turns on this question. 
What separates the United States from other countries is the 
minimal and fundamental nature of the duties its citizens owe the 
                                                                                                                         
 
40 (1777) reprinted in, 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS, 
COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATE, supra, at 2637 (“And 
whereas it is of the utmost importance to the safety of every State that it should al-
ways be in a condition of defence; and it is the duty of every man who enjoys the 
protection of society to be prepared and willing to defend it; this convention there-
fore . . . doth ordain, determine, and declare that the militia of this State, at all times 
hereafter, as well in peace as in war, shall be armed and disciplined, and in readiness 
for service.”). 
187 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918). 
188 Id. at 390 (emphasis added). 
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state. During World War II, the people were not commandeered to 
work in defense plants or buy war bonds. Even voting is not man-
dated in the United States. This is why so many Americans instinc-
tively sense that empowering Congress to commandeer the people 
to engage in economic activities would fundamentally change the 
relationship between themselves and their government. Conversely, 
those who are not bothered by the individual mandate likely hold a 
very capacious notion of the duties owed by the citizen to the 
state—so capacious that they include ‘the supreme and noble duty’ 
to engage in any activity that Congress deems to be convenient to 
its regulation of interstate commerce. 
In both New York and Printz, Justices O’Connor and Scalia sup-
plemented their analysis with pragmatic reasons why state sover-
eignty is important in a federal system. For example, Justice 
O’Connor stressed the reduction in accountability “when, due to 
federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance 
with the views of the local electorate in matters not preempted by 
federal regulation.”189 Mandates on states are improper because, 
“where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it 
may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, 
while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may 
remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their deci-
sion.”190 
Likewise, the proposition that commandeering the people as a 
means of regulating commerce violates popular sovereignty is also 
supported by pragmatic considerations. Like mandates on states, 
economic mandates undermine political accountability, though in a 
different way. The public is acutely aware of tax increases. Rather 
than incur the political cost of imposing a general tax on the public 
using its tax powers, economic mandates allow Congress and the 
President to escape accountability for tax increases by compelling 
citizens to make payments directly to private companies.  
                                                          
 
189 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (O’Connor, J.). 
190 Id. 
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That the individual insurance mandate was designed to obviate 
political accountability is evidenced by President Obama’s high 
profile denial—while the Act was still pending in the Senate—that 
the mandate constituted a tax increase. The President needed to 
avoid accountability for breaking his repeated pledge not to raise 
taxes on persons making below a certain amount of money, so he 
vehemently denied that the mandate imposed a tax. “For us to say 
that you’ve got to take a responsibility to get health insurance is 
absolutely not a tax increase.”191 One suspects that this is why the 
Senate bill was crafted as a regulation of commerce enforced by a 
penalty, rather than as a revenue-raising tax. As Judge Vinson 
wrote when dismissing the government’s tax power theory on its 
merits: 
 
Congress should not be permitted to secure and cast politi-
cally difficult votes on controversial legislation by deliber-
ately calling something one thing, after which the defenders 
of that legislation take an “Alice-in-Wonderland” tack and 
argue in court that Congress really meant something else 
entirely, thereby circumventing the safeguard that exists to 
keep their broad power in check.192 
 
Once Congress is allowed to avoid invoking its tax power by 
mandating citizens to engage in economic activity, Congress can 
engage in all sorts of “off budget” commands that citizens “buy” 
some goods or services. The problem of accountability caused by 
mandating that persons pay money to private companies implicates 
concerns quite similar to those underlying the Takings Clause.193 In 
                                                          
 
191 Interview by George Stephanopoulos with Barack Obama, U.S. President, (Sept. 
9, 2009), available at http://blogs.abcnews.com/george/2009/09/obama-mandate-is-
not-a-tax.html. 
192 Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs.,716 F.Supp.2d 1120,1143 (N.D.Fla. 
2010). 
193 Whether this mandated payment from private persons to private companies 
also constitutes a “taking” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment is a complex ques-
tion that is beyond the scope of this paper. For a suggestive discussion of why regu-
lations compelling payments to a private party could be considered a taking because 
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the first 150 years of our history, perhaps the most commonly given 
example of a statute so unjust that it is not properly called a law is 
the taking from A to give to B. Whether or not economic mandates 
are technically “takings” under existing doctrine, however, they 
raise comparable concerns.194 
For these reasons, therefore, the individual mandate is not 
merely another regulation among countless ones imposed on the 
American people by the federal government. It crosses an important 
line between limited and unlimited government power. If a power 
to impose an economic mandate because it is “convenient” to the 
regulation of commerce is upheld here, then Congress could man-
date any behavior so long as it is cast as part of a broad regulatory 
scheme. Today it is buying government approved health insurance. 
Tomorrow it could be having an annual physical or mandating 
what you eat. What sounds farfetched now can change with the 
political winds. 
Ordinarily, persons are responsible for their failure to act—or 
omissions—when they have a preexisting duty to act. A mandate to 
act, therefore, presupposes the existence of a duty, such as the duty 
of a citizen to defend the country. But with the individual mandate 
there is no traditionally recognized pre-existing duty. The duty to 
purchase health insurance is entirely of Congress’s creation. Unless 
they voluntarily choose to engage in activity that is within Con-
gress's power to regulate or prohibit, the American people retain 
their sovereign power to refrain from entering into contracts with 
private parties, even when commandeering them to do so may be 
convenient to the regulation of commerce among the several states. 
                                                                                                                         
 
they undercut political accountability, see Chaim Gordon, Note, Protecting Peter when 
the Legislature Robs Peter to Pay Paul after Empress Casino v. Giannoulias, 63 TAX L. 1299 
(2010) (discussing the reasoning of the plurality opinion in Eastern Enterprises v. 
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). 
194 See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.) (“An ACT of 
the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the 
social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority. [For 
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and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it 
cannot be presumed that they have done it.”). 
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 VI. CONCLUSION: FROM CITIZENS TO SUBJECTS 
The third way of assessing constitutionality is to try to predict 
whether the Supreme Court will uphold or strike down the indi-
vidual mandate. As everyone knows, the Supreme Court is loath to 
strike down any acts of Congress, but especially legislation that en-
joys popular approval and acceptance.195 If when it reaches the Su-
preme Court, the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” fits 
this description, I would predict that the Justices will strive mightily 
to uphold it. I would also predict that, as in Raich, they would avoid 
appearing to adopt a virtually open-ended interpretation of the 
commerce power as the government had urged. Nor would they 
adopt the even more radical theory that Congress can use its tax 
power to penalize any activity or inactivity so long as the penalty is 
a fine collected by the IRS. Instead, they would likely invoke their 
already latitudinarian interpretation of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to find that the mandate is an essential part of a broader 
regulatory scheme that would be undercut if this “economic deci-
sion” to “self-insure” cannot be regulated.  
But suppose that, when the “Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act” reaches the Court, it is perceived by the Justices to be un-
popular. Suppose it is also widely perceived to have been adopted 
by a bare partisan majority employing unusual and suspect parlia-
mentary maneuvers to avoid the consequences of the loss of “Ted 
Kennedy’s” seat in the Senate—a senatorial election that turned on 
opposition to this particular measure in Massachusetts of all 
places.196 Suppose this Act is also perceived to be an important rea-
son why Democrats lost control of the House of Representatives in 
an election in which Democrats ran away from the Act to avoid de-
feat.  
                                                          
 
195 See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(2009). 
196 See Michael Cooper, G.O.P. Senate Victory Stuns Democrats, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010, 
at A1, available at, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/us/politics/20election.html. 
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Now, I am not suggesting that the Supreme Court would strike 
down the individual mandate simply because a majority perceived 
it to be unpopular. But I do think that, if the Court views the Act as 
manifestly unpopular, there may well be five Justices who are open 
to valid constitutional objections they might otherwise resist. This 
then returns us to the dubious justifications of the mandate based 
on the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses or the tax 
power.  
If the Act continues to be perceived as unpopular, I doubt that a 
majority of the Court would stretch the “essential to a broader 
scheme” doctrine to reach inactivity and authorize economic man-
dates. A majority of the justices would be quite comfortable limiting 
the power of Congress to reaching activity under the “necessary” 
prong of the Necessary and Proper Clause since doing so would 
affect only one law: the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  
Perhaps most importantly, none of what is sometimes called by 
law professors the “New Deal Settlement” would be called into 
question by refusing to extend the substantial effects doctrine to 
inactivity or by forbidding the commandeering of the people as a 
means of regulating interstate commerce, thereby barring economic 
mandates. The minimalist character of this theory is likely to appeal 
to Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Kennedy, Alito and 
Scalia.  
Moreover, both Justices Thomas and Scalia would immediately 
see that an economic mandate must not only be necessary, it must 
also be proper. These Justices would also realize that the logic of 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Printz could rather simply be carried over 
to this novel claim of congressional power. Justice Scalia could 
write in his sleep the opinion holding that economic mandates in 
general, and the individual insurance mandate in particular, consti-
tute an improper commandeering of the people.  
True, extending its anti-commandeering doctrine from the 
states to the people would be novel, but this is due entirely to the 
novelty of the individual mandate itself. Before Congress attempted 
to commandeer the American people, the Court never needed to 
explain why such a thing was improper. The same was true when 
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the Court for the first time developed its anti-commandeering doc-
trine in the 1990s. As Justice Scalia observed, “[f]ederal comman-
deering of state governments is such a novel phenomenon that this 
Court’s first experience with it did not occur until the 1970’s.”197 
The first commandeering of the people as a means of regulating 
interstate commerce occurred in 2010 and immediately triggered a 
widespread and sustained popular outcry. 
The anti-commandeering principle precisely identifies why the 
individual mandate has so riled the American people. Ordinarily, 
persons are responsible for their failure to act–or omissions–when 
they have a preexisting duty to act. A mandate to act, therefore, 
presupposes the existence of a duty. But unlike the type of preexist-
ing fundamental duties that have traditionally been recognized, 
such as the duties to defend one’s country and provide the revenue 
needed to maintain its governance, there is no fundamental duty of 
citizenship to enter into contracts with private parties when Con-
gress deems it convenient to the regulation of interstate commerce. 
Upholding such mandates would truly turn citizens into subjects. 
Either the national government has unlimited power over the 
people or its powers are limited. If the latter, there must be some 
limit to the Necessary and Proper Clause. Courts could limit its 
scope by examining the substance of each law to see if it is truly 
necessary, but this they have declined to do. Instead, the Court has 
developed formal doctrines to identify when an exercise of power is 
incidental to the regulation of commerce, and when it is remote and 
unnecessary. If, however, Congress is allowed to regulate any deci-
sion that has an economic effect, or that Congress deems essential to 
its regulatory ambitions, then the scheme of limited and enumer-
ated powers would be at an end. Because it is both unnecessary un-
der existing doctrine and also improper, the individual health in-
surance mandate is unconstitutional. 
                                                          
 
197 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1996). 
